After the Applause Stops: Nice’s Aftermath and the Prospects for CESDP by Duke, Simon
24 Eipascope 2001/1 http://www.eipa.nl
It was generally acknowledged that one of the more
successful outcomes of the French Presidency and the
2000 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was the
progress made on the Common European Security and
Defence Policy (CESDP). The French Presidency can of
course claim some of the credit for advancing CESDP,
but it really represents the cumulative efforts of the EU
Member States and four presidencies since the historic
Anglo-French St Malo summit of December 1998 set the
ball rolling. But, contrary to some of the laudatory
comments, the outcome of the IGC and the French
Presidency saw advances in non-military and military
crisis management and not, as is sometimes claimed,
defence. This is not just a semantic point since it is
precisely in defence that progress has not been made and
probably will not be for a while to come. A more accurate
portrayal of progress to date might refer to the emergence
of a European security policy (ESP) and no more.
Prior to the Nice summit few modifications had been
expected to Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) and many, including legal experts, queried
whether any changes would be necessary. Yet, the
changes that did take place are significant. Two in
particular stand out. In Article 17 of the TEU all references
to the Western European Union (WEU), bar one, were
removed. The modification implies that the WEU is no
longer an ‘integral part of the Union’, it does not provide
the Union with ‘access to an operational capability’,
notably for Petersberg tasks, it will not assist the Union
‘in framing the defence aspects’ of the CFSP. Nor can the
Union  ‘avail itself’ of the WEU to ‘elaborate and
implement’ decisions and actions of the Union with
defence implications.
The changes to Article 17, which were largely
foreshadowed by the WEU’s Marseilles Declaration of
13 November 2000, may have significant implications
for the second pillar. The vestiges of the WEU still
uphold the collective defence guarantee contained in
Article V of the Modified Brussels treaty, as well as the
armaments collaboration aspects of the nineteen-
member Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).2
It is though unclear how serious the WEU’s Article V
commitment is, especially in light of the transferral of
key assets, such as the Satellite Centre, to the EU. The
centre may be critical for the EU’s ability to conduct
Petersberg tasks but, presumably, it is not irrelevant to
the WEU’s defence obligations. Other residual problems
due to the changes in Article 17 may also come to the
fore. For example, if the WEU no longer provides access
to an ‘operational capability’, does this then mean that
the Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) are only
available for Article V contingencies, or might they
become FAEU? The role of the interim European Defence
and Security Assembly (the former Parliamentary
Assembly) is also left up in the air.
A further significant impediment to the short-term
development of CESDP may also come about as a result
of the WEU’s former practice of operating at 21 (the ten
full members, the six associate members and the five
observers) and at 28 (as before, plus the seven associate
partners). The WEU associate members, which included
Norway and Turkey, enjoyed full involvement in the
WEU Council. With the effective dissolution of these
extended ties, the former WEU observers, who are all EU
members, enjoy a privileged position since they are
fully involved in CFSP decision making. The perceived
need to respect EU decision-making autonomy is
currently at odds with Turkey’s objections to the lack of
any CESDP equivalent to the status it enjoyed under the
WEU. This may lead to persistent efforts by Ankara to
block any guaranteed access to NATO planning
capabilities for EU-led Petersberg missions.
The effective separation of crisis management and
defence tasks between the WEU and EU poses the
question of whether the EU Member States have any
interest in developing a common defence policy or
common defence – notions that remain in the TEU. The
outcome of the IGC suggests that this is a highly divisive
issue that is not only confined to the smaller neutral or
non-aligned EU Member States. Various proposals to
maintain some linkage between the EU, the WEU and
Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty in the form of
a declaration attached to the treaty were rejected.
The continuation of the work of nineteen-member
WEAG under the WEU’s umbrella may also mark a lost
opportunity. Article 17 of the TEU maintains the vague
formula that the progressive framing of a ‘defence policy’
will be supported, ‘as Member States consider
appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field
of armaments’. Yet it was agreed in the context of crisis
management at St Malo that Europe needs strengthened
armed forces ‘which are supported by a strong and
competitive European defence industry and technology’.
As it is, the work of WEAG, POLARM (within the EU),
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Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière
d’Armement (OCCAR) and the Letter of Intent (LoI)
countries continues in a piecemeal fashion. Hopefully
some consolidation of their activities might be considered
in the near future.
The second notable change saw the replacement of
the Political Committee in Article 25 by the Political
and Security Committee (PSC). It is the PSC that will,
amongst other things, exercise political and strategic
direction of crisis management operations under the
responsibility of the Council. The modifications to this
act are particularly profound since they attribute legal
authority not only to the PSC but also to CESDP in
general. The PSC has been described as the ‘linchpin of
European security and defence policy and of the CFSP’
and it is also the anchor for the Military Committee and
Military Staff. The incorporation of the PSC into the
(provisional) Nice Treaty has the potential to be
revolutionary provided the permanent PSC represent-
ation is of sufficiently senior status.
It is easy to forget, amongst the general euphoria
surrounding the rapid progress of CESDP, that what has
been achieved is a start, and nothing more. Not only is
it a start, it may also prove to be the easier part of the
overall goal of establishing a working CESDP. A number
of tough challenges are on the horizon and four deserve
special mention.
Has CESDP outpaced CFSP?
First, any progress made in CESDP needs to be matched
by developments elsewhere in the EU’s external relations.
CESDP is not an end in itself but the continuation of a
range of other instruments that, when combined, should
provide a seamless web of options with which to address
crisis scenarios. This may involve the ability to intervene
diplomatically, to use various forms of economic
leverage (both positive and negative), to credibly
threaten the use of military force and, if necessary, to use
it. Developments since St Malo have concentrated on
the upper end of the EU’s crisis management abilities
perhaps at the cost of the concentrating on the linkage
between the various forms of crisis prevention and
management that could be employed. The different
modus operandi of the pillars, the overlapping and often
confusing mandates of the Commission and the Council
Secretariat, most notably in the cases of the Commissioner
for External Relations and the High Representative for
CFSP, and numerous shortcomings in the EU Member
States crisis management capacities, mean that the EU
is not yet in a position to offer a seamless web of options
to address crisis scenarios that may call for military
intervention and a sustained presence. For the foreseeable
future only the U.S. will have this ability, if matched
with the necessary political resolve.
Enhancing EU-NATO relations
Second, the French Presidency report on European
Security and Defence Policy detailed the emerging
cooperation between the EU and NATO in both non-
crisis and crisis situations. Relations between the two
organisations are however in an early and thus delicate
stage. One of the key issues to be addressed is the Turkish
demand for greater inclusion in CESDP. The EU has to
preserve its institutional autonomy whilst, perhaps in
reaction to persistent U.S. pressure, it must find a way to
respond to Turkey’s demands (as well as those of the
other non-EU European NATO members). Any failure to
do so runs the risk of stifling EU-NATO cooperation in
its infancy and may push key EU Member States towards
greater autonomy (and thus duplication) from NATO
than they may have wanted. For its part, Turkey must
consider whether it is in its long-term interests to block
EU access to NATO planning facilities and other assets,
especially in light of its EU candidacy and ongoing
talks on enhanced customs union.
The issue of communications and, more specifically
their security, may also complicate EU-NATO relations.
Following proposals made by Solana in July 2000 to
exclude sensitive documents covering security and
defence, justice and home affairs as well as trade and aid,
from the normal handling procedures providing for
openness and transparency, Finland, the Netherlands
and Sweden voiced their opposition, as did the European
Parliament. A forthcoming European court case on this
issue may significantly compromise the development
of CESDP if a decision is made to uphold the principles
of openness and transparency of Article 255 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community. Anything
significantly less than the equivalent to NATO’s own
classification and handling procedures for EU security-
related matters would presumably stifle the willingness
of individual NATO members to share information with
the leak-prone EU. Since Sweden was one of the countries
to oppose the draft common position, it has become
something of a poisoned chalice for the current
Presidency.
Transatlantic relations under the Bush
administration
Third, the Bush administration is in its early days.
Nevertheless there are enough storm clouds on the
horizon to cause concern. The apparent determination
of the Bush administration to push ahead with missile
defence (MD) has met with little open support amongst
the European allies and from some quarters, most notably
France, opposition. A major transatlantic split on this
issue could complicate the EU’s access to euphemistic-
ally called ‘NATO assets’ for ‘Europe only’ operations
under NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force concept.
Certainly, it may make public opinion in the U.S. more
reluctant to engage in multilateral crisis management
operations. It may also split the European allies,
especially France and the United Kingdom. Although
the Blair government is guarded on the issue (especially
since it would involve modifying the Flylingdales early
warning radar), British support for MD risks damaging
Anglo-French relations and thus the ‘engine’ of CESDP.
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atlantic relations and London’s continuing willingness
to frame CESDP in the context of buttressing the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The impression that
fissures may be developing in EU-UK relations was
compounded by British participation in U.S. air strikes
against selected Iraqi air defence installations around
Baghdad in mid February 2001. Amongst the
international condemnation of the strikes, the voices of
France and Turkey were pronounced.
Disputes in the civilian aerospace sector, specifically
the mutual charges of illegal subsidies being paid for the
development of Airbus and Boeing aircraft, also hold
the potential to cause a major rift in transatlantic relations.
Until now disputes have involved vexatious, but
relatively minor, aspects of transatlantic trade (bananas,
beef hormones and so forth). The civilian aerospace
sector is critical to the EU Member States as well as the
U.S. and a major dispute in this area could have significant
knock-on effects for CESDP post-Nice. It may, once
again, push the EU in the direction of a more autonomous
CESDP.
Matching resolve with resources … déjà vu all over
again?
Finally, CESDP suffers from an underlying gap between
resolve and resources. Any dispute that pushed the EU
towards a more autonomous CESDP would currently
call the EU’s bluff. In its current form, the economics of
CESDP only makes sense if one assumes access to a
number of ‘NATO assets’ (read U.S.) in certain critical
areas. The static or declining defence budgets of the
majority of EU Member States stand in stark contrast to
the long list of shortcomings in European capabilities
identified by the November 1999 WEU Audit of Assets
and Capabilities and the almost identical list unveiled
at the Capabilities Commitment Conference a year later.
The continuation of current defence trends will not
only damage CESDP but NATO itself. Current defence
trends will not only heighten the technology gap between
the U.S. and its European allies but may also accentuate
technology gaps within Europe. Efforts to do more with
the same by, for example, converting to professional
armed forces rather than reliance on conscript forces, are
of dubious economic soundness. Even if the economics
is sound, reallocation of defence budgets is unlikely to
yield the kind of short-term results needed to meet the
Headline Goals. This leaves the EU heavily reliant upon
presumed or guaranteed access to key ‘NATO assets’
which, as has been argued, may not be forthcoming. The
need for increased defence budgets and wiser expenditure
seems unavoidable.
Conclusion
CESDP is a work in the making. The Nice summit
represents a commendable start, but no more. The
emergence of the institutional structures to address non-
military and military aspects of crisis management is
encouraging. The slower progress on developing
cooperation and consultation mechanisms with the
EU+6 and EU+15 is less encouraging, especially with
Turkey’s position in mind. The early (and perhaps
premature) signs emanating from the Bush admini-
stration indicate a number of pitfalls in the near future
for transatlantic relations that can hopefully be avoided.
The development of relations with third parties and
organisations will undoubtedly shape CESDP, but the
decisive challenges lie within the EU. The development
of CESDP is only useful in so far as it moves the EU
towards the development of a seamless web of crisis
management responses. Careful attention must therefore
be paid to ensuring that CESDP is complemented by
developments in conflict prevention. This implies that
more emphasis and not just lip-service must be placed
on consistency in the EU’s external relations generally.
For the Member States the main challenge is for them to
prove that resolve can be matched with resources — and
apologies if this sounds like the old capabilities-
expectations gap all over again.
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NOTES
1 A version of this article appeared in the on-line journal,
Challenge Europe. The article may be found at the European
Policy Centre’s web site, http://www.theepc.be. Some of the
themes raised in this contribution are also explored in more
depth in Between Vision and Reality: CFSP’s Progress on
the Path to Maturity. The book is edited by Dr. Simon Duke
and is the outcome of a colloquium held in November 1999
which gathered together top academics and practitioners to
explore the progress and pitfalls of progress towards a
Common Foreign and Security Policy and, in particular, in
formulating a Common European and Security Policy.
‘I commend this book to all those who are interested not
only in the latest developments in Europe’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy but also its potential for the
future. The various contributions raise important issues
which all of us will be grappling with over the next few
years. This book helps shed some light on the path which
lies ahead’.
From the foreword by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General,
High Representative of the European Union for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy.
2 Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty reads, ‘If any of
the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed
attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the
military and other aid and assistance in their power’. 